1. Modern Chinese Culture: Crisis and The Turning Point

The modern Chinese history over the last 150 years is one in which Chinese culture has been gradually deconstructed.

Here are the basic causes of this deconstruction: the passive, large-scale cultural exchange on the part of Chinese culture with the hegemonic outside culture, and the internal development of Chinese culture itself.

Such deconstruction is fundamental, as it happens at all levels of the cultural value system, whether they are mainstream tradition or derivative beliefs, refined culture or popular culture. And this is the fate of Chinese culture in this century.

The stormy attack upon traditional Chinese culture began with the May 4 cultural movement around 1919, which established itself as the starting point of cultural radicalism and the tortuous process of joining the world cultural development.

The symbolic end of the traditional Chinese culture as a whole was 2 June, 1927 , when Wang Guowei, the sinologist master of his generation, committed suicide in the Kunming Lake to complete his personal sacrifice for Chinese culture.

Since 1949, the cultural crisis in mainland China becomes more and more acute and the harsh environment has turn China into a cultural wasteland where the non-cultural or even the anti-cultural prevail. Chinese culture has metaphorically entered into diaspora with its fragments scattered around the world.

Chronologically, this crisis, as shown in the Mao era and the Deng era, have different symptoms.

In the Mao era, politics totally controlled culture, which was under attack from two sides. On the one hand, Marxism-Leninism came in to dominate China as a national ideology. Traditional features like humanism, propriety, tolerance and refined manners were labelled feudalistic and eliminated by the political system. On the other hand, certain politicised Confucian concepts, such as "the three cardinal guides and the five constant virtues", were used to form the management model of the ruling class and provide the cultural background for the political operation of the Communist dictatorship. The cultural crisis is closely related to the fact that politicised Confucianism and Marxism share the same structure, and to the "anti-intellectualism" shared by the vulgar culture and marginalized cultural thinking in Marxism, Leninism and Mao thought.

Under this double blow, the collapse of culture was complete during the so-called "Cultural Revolution", when the opposite "anti-tradition" and "extreme tradition" appeared at the same time. With "anti-tradition" and other official slogans aimed to sweep away old customs, feudalism and political enemies, the genteel class was eliminated, intellectuals and the representatives of Chinese culture were prosecuted, millenniums of Chinese civilisation, along with cultural classics and relics, were destroyed. While on the other hand, the imperial, hierarchical system, the monarchical power and obscurantism were prevalent to their extremity. With literary unjust cases all over the country, ruffian behavior played the tyrant. As China became a cultural desert, the massive cultural exile was inevitable.

The Deng era was initially marked with criticism of the practice of the Mao era, and this brought a temporary revival of Chinese culture. First, following the reaction against cultural dictatorship typical of "the rule of men" and indiscriminate introduction of various Western cultural trends, came the pluralistic "culture fever" in 1980s. Cultural radicalism was once again rejuvenated with the aid of May 4 anti-traditional thinking. Then, as cultural studies continued, the academic circle began to reexamine the May 4 movement. In the late Deng era, cultural conservatism also became one of the topics of debates.

However, the after-effect of decades of the cultural break, the shallow cultural thinking and the lack of deep cultural foundation all contributed to the change of situation after June 1989. Under the high political pressure, the cultural tide quickly receded, while commercial floods spread over the country. Nevertheless, this serious cultural crisis brings the potential historical opportunity of the real cultural transformation.

In general, there is not direct connection between economic development and value crisis. But without the basic social, political and economic infrastructure, the rapid economic expansion can lead to the collapse of the value system.

As China is a family-style "private society" devoid of "civil society", the lack of civil consciousness and civil ethics cannot be filled up or improved by economic progress alone.

Having a weak religious conscience, the feature of transcendence is often obscure and inward in Chinese culture. The Chinese on the whole don't hold a covenant with the transcendental, holy God, nor have they formalised ceremony to strengthen this identity. With the lack of holiness, the poverty in transcendentalism, and the difficulty in religious redemption, the moral value resources of this secular culture, especially when its traditional value system is being abandoned, will be less and less, resulting in the deterioration of the spiritual vigor and the value norms.

The present situation in China is that after decades of poverty, the long depressed desire for wealth is released for the first time. And the mass consume culture that has devoured the whole world has entered China without any resistance. The difference here is that money-worship in China happens immediately after forty years' unprecedented cultural break. In a society where communist politics and doctrine are grouped, hypocrisy is inevitable: the polarised split between actual behavior and propaganda, between private and public life, between standards applied to the upper and lower levels of the society. While it destroys its acclaimed moral ethics, the consumer culture further deconstructs the "Party culture" of the CCP and the traditional Chinese culture. Therefore, where there is not modernised "rule of law", where the community faith has diminished, where traditional value is broken-down, and where spiritual religion is extremely fragile, commercialism is the only thing that can prevail. Because of this, money-worship is like a horse without harness causing the moral cultural crisis and the break-down of the general value system.

The cultural crisis in China lies mainly in the loss of humanist spirituality and the general value vacuum. The mainland faces the danger of once again gliding into the wasteland devoid of value and culture.

This is the cultural tragedy of the Chinese for the last hundred years.

From the geographical perspective, one of the results of this tragedy is that since '50s, the once highly unified culture is now fragmented, leading to a variety of cultural derivatives, such as mainland Chinese culture, Taiwanese Chinese culture, Hong Kong Chinese culture, Singaporean Chinese culture and Overseas Chinese culture. Although still called Chinese culture, they have their distinctive forms.

To be more specific, since 1949, Chinese culture has been "deteriorating inside and shriving outside". one of the fact is that for the last several decades, the base of Chinese cultural study has been consistently moving overseas (especially to Taiwan and Hong Kong ) at a large scale (1949, 1962, 1979-1989, 1989-now). Its overseas representatives and heritage has surpassed those in the mainland. Such a cultural exile is unprecedented.

The second fact is that in order to maintain popular morale, the mainland authority has recently instructed the academic circle to carry out Chinese studies. However, even among key research projects approved by the authority, such as "Study of Modern Neo-Confucian Thought", the emphasis is on those designated figures like Liang Shu-ming, Zhang Jun-man, Xiong Shi-li, Ma Yi-fu, Feng You-lan, He Lin, Tang Jun-yi, Mou Zong-san, Xu Fu-guan, Qian Mu, Fang Dong-mei. It is not difficult to find that even in the eyes of the Beijing authority, most of the above scholars representing the major Chinese trend (Confucianism) live abroad, while those remaining in China completed their master works before 1949. For instance, "Chinese Culture and the World--Our Shared View of the Chinese Academic Research and of the Future of Chinese and World Culture", the so-called "Modern Chinese Culture Declaration" in 1959, was signed and declared by Zhang Jun-man, Tang Jun-yi, Mou Zong-san and Xu Fu-guan outside mainland China.

This present trend will continue well into the next century: the Chinese and Chinese culture leave the native land, exile overseas, form different communities; they identify themselves with Chinese culture without holding a Chinese nationality. Such exodus will go into history.

This is what we call the phenomenon of "deteriorating inside and shriving outside". It is rare in history. And its historical outcome can be seen in many variations of Chinese culture.

In effect, communities like "the mainland Chinese", "the Taiwanese", "the Hong Kong people", "the Singaporeans" and "the overseas Chinese" differ considerably from one another in such cultural aspects as behavioral approach, thinking mode, mental attitude and vocabulary. People often mention the ability of the mainland Chinese to go around the rules, their positive attitude and eloquence; the courtesy, maturity and sophistication of the Taiwanese; the law-abiding conscience, the community sense and the empirical characteristic of the Hong Kong people, the docility, the punctiliousness, authority-worshipping of the Singaporeans.... The linguistic style and wording are so different that some have claimed that the segregated evolution over the last several decades has left its imprint on the appearance, gesture and image of these communities. If you come across a strange Chinese, you can almost tell correctly his community background in no time.

To use a well-known image: Chinese culture, like an ancient tree, is withered, its seeds have lost their root, and therefore have to wander around the world to grow into several new trees in different soil. Thus, we see that different young plants can be attributed to the same family, and different types of appearance share the same origin.

Such extraordinary phenomenon is of course due to different environments.

Nevertheless, the strong commitment to Chinese culture is also based on the rare fact that contemporary political, economic and cultural strata in China are no longer in accord with one another. A China which once combined these three in one no longer exists. That is to say, the current historical framework presents China with three unmatched parts: the economic China , the political China and the cultural China .

The economic China refers to the great economic market that consists of mainland China , Hong Kong , Taiwan and Singapore , namely, one that covers the Chinese economic areas. Its current performance has become a miracle in the depressed world market.

Narrowly speaking, the political China means mainland China under the control of CCP; broadly speaking, it refers to three conflicting political bodies: PRC (mainland), RC ( Taiwan ) and Hong Kong . As political structures in China 's history, these separated political bodies are all transitional.

The definition of cultural China is given in its broad sense by the overseas Chinese scholars: (I) mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore; (II) Chinese communities in East Asia, SE Asia, South Asia, Pacific areas, North America, Latin America, Europe and Africa; (III) students, intellectuals, freelance writers, media professionals, employees and even ordinary readers over the world who are either involved in China studies or interested in Chinese culture.

The degree of identity as to these three strata by people in mainland China is different from that by those overseas. While the identity with cultural China is stable and durable, that with economic China features in practicality and utility. As for political China , the identity level is not only low, but surprisingly divided. It is not difficult to see why. The identity with cultural China is based the long-standing cultural, language, and family heritage, which is the basic identity. The identity with economic China comes from the logic of economic benefit; and the tense dissatisfaction with political China originates in the tragedy of China 's modern political history. Above all, the current political situation in China is the inevitable outcome of this history.

In the geographical sense, while the exile of Chinese culture has greatly increased since '50s, the Chinese cultural society and communities are expanding. Therefore, the geographical identity has become less and less acute.

Thus, as mainland political environment has been hostile to its culture, the political identity is far from a appealing issue.

While both the geographical and political identity have been diluted, cultural identity has been strengthened, and this must be an important feature in our understanding of contemporary China .

In the long run, the cultural identity, determined by its stability and fundamentality, will become the foundation of the economic and political transformation. It is from this perspective that the historical importance of the recreation and reconfiguration of Chinese culture becomes evident.

The theory of "Cultural China" discussed among mainland and overseas Chinese scholars is set against the tempo-spatial crisis that confronts Chinese culture. It is, in this sense, the destined effort of the Chinese intellectual elites to reconstruct Chinese culture and its value system.

With a discerning eye, it is not difficult to find that in real Chinese culture, the initial reconstruction processes in different geographical locations may be characterised as isolated. The variations of the same Chinese origin exist apart from one another. And it is only recently that the spatial contact begins and interaction takes place, unfolding a complicated cultural picture.

The current cultural state may be described as "unprecedented for three thousand years": the unified traditional Chinese culture is disintegrated, many of the historically established concepts have been lost, while concepts inconceivable before become part of reality. This rapidly changing cultural situation, far from being set into a model, is still seeking its relatively stable vital form.

Disintegration, split, separation, interaction between cultural variations, in addition to cultural exile at a large scale: these phenomena put the reconstruction and Chinese culture and its value system in the limelight of history. Our historical task is no less than this: to grasp this open historical opportunity, help the interaction between cultural variations, reconstruct Chinese culture and its value system in this process.

It is quite imaginable that the formation of a value system, which appeals to wide communities, will be converted into a cultural force, benefiting the transformation of Chinese culture and therefore advancing our living environment.

2 . Spiritual Resources of Chinese Culture

In the reconstruction of Chinese cultural value system, it is essential to study and draw from a variety of important cultural resources, such as Confucian tradition, Taoism, Buddhism, Christianity and Chinese Islamism.

However, the most important part of our resources is the remembrance of our nation. And we must understand out heritage in an unideological way.

Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism, which contains a reply to the challenge from the modern world, deserve our close attention, as they are deeply linked with Chinese tradition and are important spiritual resources in our dealing with present problems. In effect, contemporary Neo-Confucianism means a new illustration of Chinese cultural when the latter faces the critical crisis. Just like the Confucianists in the Sun and Ming Dynasties who reinterpreted Confucianism when facing competition from Buddhism and created the new Sun-Ming ethics, today's reillustration of Confucianism has won broad consent and lays the basis for what is called "the third stage in the development of Confucianism". The Confucianist creative work, as a spiritual link of the cultural identity, is set to become a cultural force and to make its important contribution to the reconstruction of Chinese cultural value system.

The Taoist thinking represented by Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi has explored the metaphysical dimension of Chinese culture and in many ways has enlightened the postmodern forms of life regarding the men-nature relation.

Distinctive regional cultures in ancient and modern China , such as Huanghe culture, Chu-Xiang culture, Wu-Yue culture, Guangdong culture, Sichuan culture, plus the above mentioned variations of Chinese culture, are our invaluable treasure resources.

We shall never forget another spiritual resource--humanism--in modern China . For the last hundred years or so, starting from Kang You-Wei and Liang Qi-Chao, we have Zhang Tai-Yan, Wang Guo-Wei, Chen Yin-ke, Cai Yuan-Pei, Gu Hong-Ming, Hu Shih, Li Shu-Tong, Lu Xun, Liang Shu-Ming, Xiong Shi-Li, Qian Mu, Zhang Jun-Li, Zhang Dong-Xun, Chu An-Ping, Lu Long-Ji, Ma Yin-Chu, Fu Lei, Yin Hai-Guang, who have all made their names in history. Despite constant hindrances, this tradition is still in progress. The humanistic creed is the response of Chinese culture to the modern world. As the problems it dealt with are similar to ours, it is necessary to draw from this heritage. Indeed, the future Chinese humanistic value system will have to build on this creed.

Meanwhile, it is noticeable that quite a few Chinese intellectuals are moving in the transcendental direction by studying Buddhism, Christianity and Islamism. Aiming to find or cultivate the essence in Chinese culture, its significance lies in discovering or even introducing the "sacredness" of Chinese culture.

Christian culture is obviously the most strong competitor to Chinese culture. As the world's leading civilisation, Christian culture, especially its protestant ethics, has a lot to offer. As Christians in mainland China are reportedly to have reached 80 millions, it is a formidable cultural force. However, a positive impact on Chinese society will only be possible if Christian doctrines are thoroughly understood. We must guard ourselves against any kind of hasty, empirical evangelicalism which is followed by less educated mass but rejected by intellectuals. In reality, the influence of different Christian denominations upon the historical Western societal transformation varies. For instance, the extreme puritan Calvinism claims that God has already determined who can be saved, and it makes no difference to worship and to do good. At first glance, this appears inhumane and unreasonable, but it has led to strong rationalism, namely, asceticism. Its practice is not for the worldly gains, but for God, not for creating capitalism, but unexpectedly produced capitalism. Besides, according to puritan creed, to glorify God, one must enter into public life in a certain way, which is already quite systematic. Therefore, the protestant ethics is not only the major religious cornerstone of Western capitalism, but that of Western democratic life. On the other side, Chinese Christians are less inclined to get involved in public life than to save oneself. Their political role is rather limited. This could partly be due to traditional Chinese culture.

Investigation into the above main Chinese and world cultural resources will be significant not only to the future of Chinese culture, but to our understanding of the global cultural disputes. Professor Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard University defines the future conflict as the "Clash of Civilizations" where Islamic and Confucian civilizations will join hand to combat Christianity. It is true that there have been symbolic religious wars after the Cold War, as people try to win over souls by all means. The most prominent clash is that between Christianity (including Catholics and protestantism) and Islamism in general. However, as far as culture is concerned, it is questionable whether the predict that "Confucianism and Islamism will join hands", based upon the understanding of the cultural relation between the two, is well founded, and whether international political logic applies to cultural relations. Professor Huntington's view, at this point, is rather limited and needs further exploration.

With the revival of the nonsecular religions at the end of this century, we see three religious attitudes: the exclusive religion which emphasises the original teaching; the inclusive religion which accepts various religions in the world but regards itself as the highest; and the pluralistic religion which holds that what is best for me is not necessarily best for my neighbor, that is, "do not do to others what you do not want other do to you", as Confucius once said. To an extent, China 's future depends largely upon the religious attitude which wins over the souls of the Chinese.

3 . The Prospect of the Culture Reconstruction

We can only rebuild our culture on our tradition.

When entering a different era, Chinese culture, especially Confucian culture, usually shows a different phase and became spiritual reflection of the time. A typical example is the above mentioned Sun-Ming Confucianism, which presents a new form when facing the competition from Buddhism.

The problems we are facing now are how should the vitality of Chinese culture be coordinated with general modernised framework of the world? and whether our culture can offer creative response to the outside challenge?

The significance here is that if the cultural spirit is still alive, or if its essential value is full of vitality, then it can always find an expressive system that carries this essence, and turns itself into a social system. The basic question in Chinese culture is, to adopt a Christian phrase, how can "the Word (Tao) become the flesh".

This is the fundamental challenge we have to face.

The Tao here means the relatively stable and lasting essential value and concepts, like the humanist "ren" and the "harmonious relation between men and nature".

These essential value concepts are, of course, not absolute. They have revised and modified in the evolutionary process. And when different cultures contact one another, the impact upon the one from the other should be a logical consequence.

We now come to a basic problem: the dilution of Chinese characteristics.

It is not difficult to see that the dilution of Chinese features means that traditional Chinese culture is no longer indigenous, singular and pure. And this is the result of the interaction between different cultures. Such interaction is inevitable, as it happens not only between different cultures (such as Chinese and Western cultures), but among variations of the same culture.

What we are concerned with here is whether there will emerge some shared features of different cultures in this interaction process, which can serve as the basic criteria of modern civilisation while maintain some of their special features.

Although the elapse of Chinese features is a price that has to be paid in the interaction, we must ask to what extent this elapse is matched to the general standard of modernization, and to what extent Chinese culture can still be recognisable? The relation between generality (standards of civilisation) and speciality (Chinese features) is complicated and sometimes contradictory. It is a serious test regarding what to accept or reject and how to make compromise. In the historical process of reconstructing value system and humanism, we might have to notice three important facts.

First, as we life in a specific historic moment rather than in the cultural vacuum, our reconstruction of Chinese cultural value system and humanism cannot transcend history, nor can it be set within a perfect framework. We will have to reconfigurate modern Chinese culture from our perspective, with our heritage and for our purpose. The future of Chinese culture, as well as the formation and the trend of the world culture are all determined by these elements, which are vital and active.

Secondly, we don't have to be confined by a fixed long term objective that is to be realised by all means. Means is above the objective, and process is everything.

Thirdly, any idea, no matter how noble and ideal, should not be generalised, manipulative, and should be kept away from power system. In effect, the reason why the process of "the Tao becomes the flesh" is less dangerous lies in its plurality and richness, as well as its separation from the power center.

This is the most valuable experience the modern Chinese culture has to offer.

The core question in the reconstruction of Chinese culture is how Chinese cultural heritage can become "flesh". This is also our basic historical responsibility.

It is not hard to conceive that for the Chinese culture which is yet to have its form or pattern, the process for the Tao to become flesh is extremely difficult and protracted. It is possible that in this process, Chinese culture will have to be reborn from ashes so as to produce modernised value system and humanist vigor. By then, the Chinese culture with brilliant past will regain its glory. it will become a wonderful sight and the spiritual support for the Chinese around the world.